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Abstract: By examining the credit crunch causes and effects, this paper 
reflects on the necessity of the banks bailout package and its alternatives and 
quantifies a maximum non-inflationary bailout amount which is unlikely to 
cause permanent adjustments in the long term (trade-weighted) exchange rate 
equilibrium level of the US dollar. Furthermore it determines that the current 
bailout amounts are less than the maximum non-inflationary bailout amount 
and determines that to resolve the underlying credit crunch problem, an 
increase in non-bank bailout M1 and/or a tax reduction is necessary. 
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Although formal acceptance of A-rated MBS tranches into the classroom 
definition of M3 has not yet occurred, Wall St had treated such tranches as money 
starting in the late nineties, on their liquidity assumption and in view that everyone 
grew accustomed to the US real estate market growing 10% a year and more until 
2007. Until 2007, virtually every new mortgage issuance that met Fannie Mae’s 
standards was sold and refinanced forward through To-Be-Announced (TBA) 
products.  
Enjoying inter-bank liquidity and credit enhancement through their over 
collateralization through subsenior tranche subordination, the MBS tranches given 
the availability of subprime mortgage origination to form the subsenior tranches met 
the voracious appetite of Wall St. for leverage during the equities and real estate 
boom, which was assumed to continue given the low comparative US ratio of 
median house price to GDP per capita. 
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It is safe to assume that given everyone’s acceptance of MBS tranches, the 
Fed’s window for refinanced assets had been used less, thus banks repoed other 
assets in the inter-bank market against MBSs. Thus in Greenspan’s years, the Fed 
issued a lot less M1 than they would have had in the absence of liquid MBSs, and 
lacked the exact picture of credit deterioration, relying on the credit ratings agencies 
as a monitor despite the fact that later the raters got heavy criticism in the media for 
their MBS ratings methodology and for the fact that they only downgraded issuances 
a posteriori (i.e. after defaults occurred). This situation surely compounded the credit 
crunch later. 
Due to the fact that bank reserves are required only on M1, except for 
tranches that did not meet the Fannie Mae criteria, there has been no slowdown on 
the credit multiplier induced by MBS tranches. Thus the magnitude of velocity 
induced by mortgage-backed-securities must have been high but formally unknown 
before the crunch commenced. Thus once the credit crunch commenced the banks 
bailout plus M1 increase policy and/or plus tax easing response in total should be the 
drop in mortgage-financed real estate value times the multiplier. Since the Fed does 
not calculate an actual multiplier but instead a M2 reserves-free velocity measure, 
which has been reported to be 1.75 in 2008 and 1.5 in first quarter 2009 (Source: 
Fed Reserve Bank of St. Louis, March 2009 Monetary Trends). The growth rate of 
velocity has been reported by the same source as at Qtr 1, 2009 to be at -50% so we 
assume the velocity for the whole 2009 to be 1.35. 
A:(M1+M2+M3+MBS)t-1*V t-1=P t-1* Q t-1 
B:(M1+M2+M3+MBS)t*V t=P t* Q tAssume M1t-1= M1t,M2t-1= M2tand M3t-1= M3t
We assume the bailout package to be non-inflationary if there is no real-
growth (i.e. velocity-adjusted) in M1, M2, M3 and MBS during the GDP 
contraction, so the bailout will replace the quasi-M3 (i.e. MtM loss of all 
mortgages). 
Obviously if the bailout package is too low, additional M1 amounts would 
have to be issued outside of the banking system, for example to buy government 
debt, in order to keep a GDP-adjusted, velocity-adjusted total monetary mass thus to 
alleviate the contraction. 
The MBS values are not entered at nominal value, but at Market Value, since 
the multiplier base for MBS is the refinancing value thus the Market Value. The bid 
values are not used since based on the analyses, the long term market values 
converge to replacement cost of collateral. By stressing the nominal value by the 
maximum shock calculated below, we obtain the market values. 
B-A=0 => (MBSt+Bailout)*V t- MBSt-1*V t-1= P t-1* Q t-1 - P t-1* Q t-1
(MBSt+Bailout)*1.35- MBSt-1*1.75=- -0.062*P t-1* Q t-1  
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But as said, MBS2009 includes the Max Bailout so by solving for MBS2009 and
subtracting MBS2009before bailout available in the Fed data, we find the Maximum non-
inflationary bailout. 
So let’s calculate the bailout and provide further insight about the credit 
crunch. 
The existing criticism to the credit rating agencies with regards to the opaque 
criteria for awarding A-ratings to MBS tranches made banks question ratings 
altogether and during the real estate exuberance accept lower rated tranches as 
collateral, the banks assuming the rating agencies to be biased downwards instead of 
upwards, making the banks assume a widespread credit improvement instead of a 
widespread credit deterioration. This conceptual error, whose culprit is indeed the 
credit raters, cost the banks dearly, since when the subordination attachment points 
of the senior tranches were bust as the credit crunch commenced and the already 
impaired subsenior tranches started to make payments to the senior tranche holders, 
the value of all collateral plummeted. 
From 2001 to 2007, the subordination levels required by the credit agencies of 
subordinate tranches by the super senior tranche decreased by 27% (Source: Morgan 
Stanley) although real estate prices have gone up double digits every year thus the 
equity levels of the year estate have been dwindling. Thus at the time the equity left 
in the houses was depleted, the subordination was reduced instead of enhanced. 
Actually full backtesting results from older CDOs were not available since most of 
the older CDOs had a life of 10 years or more so there was no clear evidence of 
excess credit enhancement. It is actually odd that rating agencies were biased against 
the senior tranches since it is their investment grade ratings that they build their 
reputation on, the subordinate tranches were high yield anyway.  
As the credit crunch started in mid-2007 with subprime (i.e. subsenior) 
defaults, which rendered senior MBS tranches with no credit protection, thus 
making prices of A-rated MBS tranches fall below Fannie Mae new issuance, except 
for the Fannie Mae issuances the MBS liquidity dropped considerably. As Fannie 
Mae started to report increasing defaults on their issuances in early 2008, the second 
mortgage refinancing collapsed, making all credit enhanced MBS suddenly 
repudiated as M3 collateral in the banking system. Even though the banking system 
had to deal with a lot of leverage now improperly collateralized, the Fed/SEC did 
not require additional collateral at once and only became involved in late 2008 
through limited bailout and/or refinancing limited senior tranches, allowing the 
crunch to start violently.  
While the Fed eased to below 1% funds rate, high yield credit spreads 
widened in 2008 to double digits (Source: Wall St Journal 2/19/2009), and the 1
st
Qtr. 2009 mortgage collateral accounting loss perception to the bubble 2006 levels is 
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pools with the owners still in the house (Source: Bloomberg, also Mark-it) (i.e. poor 
bids in the market – FAS 157 level 3 observable rules per the new FASB standard 
issued in 2007).  
Of course 10% on second mortgages is an opportunistic bid. Obviously this 
low bid would assume that all second mortgages were taken at the peak of the 
bubble, despite the fact that equity lines have 10 year repayment terms, thus the 
refinanced amount may as well reflect current real estate values for 2004 and before 
equity lines, since the yearly appreciation from 2000 to 2006 was roughly 10% a 
year and the drop from 2007 was -18% for 2008 (Source: OFHEO, 2009) 
I would introduce the dollar value difference from the 2006 price levels at the 
peak of the bubble and replacement cost as bounds of our maximum non-
inflationary bailout estimation model, and I assumed that there is no excess square 
footage per capita in the US.  
If there were excess square footage per capita in the US, the house prices 
could drop below replacement cost since there is no incentive to build. Since the 
houses prices are above replacement cost and there is no excess square footage, in 
absence of credit barriers to entry new building will in the long term drive the house 
prices to replacement cost. Indeed sales of new one-family houses in December 
2008 were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 331,000 (Source: US Census). 
Sales of new one-family houses in December 2007 were at an annual rate of 
604,000, 40.7% less than the 2006 figure of 1,019,000. This is an indication of the 
fact that although new building continues, it is decreasing and gradually the prices 
will converge to replacement cost. 
The average American home in 1950 was 983 square feet (Source: msn real 
estate) and, according to Census data, the average American household size was 
3.37 people. This means that in 1950 the average American had 292 sfpp (square 
feet per person). 
In the years that followed home size gradually grew and household size 
gradually fell until, in 2006, the average American household of 2.61 (Source: US 
Census) shared a house of 2,349 square feet (Source: US Census). So, in 2006, the 
average American had 900 sfpp, and we assume that that number has stayed 
constant in the last two years. 
Comparison of US with large countries with approximately the same 
population density per square mile such as Russia, Australia and Canada, where 
house prices have been quite stable recently, renders numbers in the same ranges 
(Sources: Rosimushchestvo, SACHA and CMHC). 
I have obtained courtesy of Allstate and Liberty Mutual electronic files of 
1000 2009 house fire insurance policies in New York Metro area (the policy price 
was blanked out for corporate pricing confidentiality purposes), for houses bought 
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Having both to replace a lot of properties destroyed by hurricane Katrina in 2006 (I 
picked the names of the 2 companies from a 2008 list of Katrina hazard loss payers 
at Insurance Information Institute), I assumed that Allstate and Liberty Mutual by 
then were expert in cost calculation, and that New York City had been at the peak of 
the bubble as much as California and Florida were overpriced compared to other 
states so the difference between their 2006 prices and their replacement cost had 
been the highest in the country. Thus in the context I considered the sample size was 
representative for the test. Obviously replacement cost and purchase price were the 
inputs in the policies I was looking for. I had found an average of 32% between the 
prices at which the 1000 New York City properties had been bought in 2006 and 
their replacement cost, with 39% of the purchase price the highest for better school 
districts and larger backyards and only supported by one insurance company, while 
the other’s highest number was 30%. So the 2 insurance companies had narrowly 
divergent views across same zip codes. Thus I am going to use the 39% number in 
my stress tests as the most severe potential drop in price brought by the credit 
crunch. Of course per actuarial science, convergence to the mean occurs over time. 
Thus to alleviate the price drop for the repossessed houses the government may want 
to hold the repossessed houses for a while as to not cause a fire sale, or to not evict 
at all during the recession. 
In 2008 68.5% of US citizens were house owners (US Census) versus 67.8% 
in 2007 and 68.9% in 2006. Thus the marginal drop from the beginning of the credit 
crunch 2 years into the credit crunch shows that people did not dump their houses 
purposely as a result of the credit crunch. The combination of a decreasing 
percentage of house owners with a decreasing number of new houses built also 
signals convergence to replacement cost as costlier properties were abandoned to 
buy newly built properties on a descending overall price trend.  
The decreasing from a high base, but stable number of house owners with an 
insignificant number of new houses built relative to the number of owners shows 
that the bank losses reported recently reflect payment stops of 6 months and more 
and not an accelerated exit from the house market, namely sale of house at amount 
less than mortgage and leaving the bank with losses, which would have changed this 
analysis. So if the banks do not repossess the houses, which would stir more volatile 
movements in the prices due to a sudden unexpected positive supply shock, the 
bailout of the government is in reality a rollover of the mortgage, a handout by the 
government to banks to make them roll over the mortgages and keep the owners in 
the house. Thus if we expect the recession to last 4 years which is a normal longer 
recession cycle, the 4 years or less of non-payments is split between government and 
banks in exchange for a shareholder stake in the banks. If the mortgage holders 
eventually find a job and resumes payments, the government makes money. Suppose 
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repossessed and the price drop for the repossessed house is 50% (a shock more 
severe than the assumed most severe price drop of 39%), the government still makes 
money as for a 16 year duration mortgage, the interest collected is 66.5% of the 
loaned amount at a 7% average rate. This is supposing that for the bailout amount 
the government charges the average mortgage rates. Thus to alleviate the price drop 
for the repossessed houses the government may want to hold the repossessed houses 
for a while as to not cause a fire sale knowing that it makes money from the 
employed pool. Jumping in on the bandwagon of previous years’ mortgage rates is a 
good idea for the government from a cost-benefit perspective in a much lower 
interest rate environment. 
It is not clear if the bailout money has a multiplier since the bailout may be 
used by some banks to meet the 8% Tier 1 reserve ratio, without the banks awarding 
fresh credit from it. If the banks award fresh credit from it, it saves the government 
from additional spending prescribed in a recession, so the money would have 
nevertheless been issued (ISLM model context). We are going to show this in Part II 
of the paper by building an ISLM model.  
However, new loan issuance reversed to negative year on year growth 
percentages in fourth quarter 2008(Source: Standard and Poor 2009), after in the 
first three quarters of the year the year-on-year growth was far below the historical 
8-10% yearly growth expectations. According to the same source, new issues of 
bonds and securitizations collapsed to almost no new issuances in 2008. 
To see if the banks’ equity is eroded, we assume prepayments to drop 
suddenly to zero during a long 4 year recession cycle, which is likely to extend the 
average US mortgage duration for a 30 year mortgage of 12 years (Source: OFHEO) 
to 16 years, with government’s help.  
Assuming the cost of funding of the banks stays the same (Fed has hinted that 
the policy of easing thus is not stopping soon thus the low interest-rate environment 
is expected to continue), as the internal rate of return in the mortgage context per 
FAS 91 is positive, extending duration by decreasing prepayments is increasing the 
accounts receivable while keeping constant the internal rate of return (see table 
below) thus the profit. Making the same analysis under the opportunity cost 
scenario, renders the same conclusion as currently the mortgage rates are decreasing 
and the lowest in 5 years (Source: OFHEO, March 2009). 
Table 11 An analysis of banks government bailout on banks equity. Source: self, 
hypothetical analysis.
Funds 
advanced 
USD 
Effective 
Duration 
Monthly 
Payment 
IRR=PMT/(1+i)
n
Equals old 
mortgage rate 
Discount 
rate 
PV==PMT/(1+DR)
n
DR=Discount
Rate=Opportunity cost same 
credit risk = new mortgage rate 
100,000 12  years  1,028.38  7%  5%  109,381.39 
100,000 16  years  867.21  7%  5%  112,788.67 A QUANTIFICATION OF THE 2008-2009US BAILOUT PACKAGE 133 
Therefore the bailout package in a low interest rate environment is increasing 
the equity of the banks. 
The total of mortgage-financed real estate loans in 2008 for single and multi-
family residential homes was 12,000 billion dollars (Source: Board of Governors of 
the US Federal Reserve System, 9/18/08). Thus if we assume a 39% shock on this 
number, the 787 billion proposed rescue package seems minuscule at less than one 
percent of the total mortgage base. 
The 12,000 billion dollars mortgage base does reflect the correct number to 
apply the maximum shock on, since over 2004-2007, the growth rate of this number 
is close to the real estate index yearly appreciation, the rough price appreciation of 
real estate during that time. We want to see if the owners maxed out on their second 
mortgages/ equity lines thus aggresively monetizing the real estate appreciation. 
Thus knowing that the new houses sold get new mortgages, we backed out the 
yearly new homes sold at the average US home price out of the total mortgages 
number to see a clean refinancing growth trend. The house ownership percentages 
are quite stable, their increase by 1% in 2004 let’s assume bought new homes in 
2004 as 1% of the total population of US is close to the new houses built and sold to 
new owners in that year. As the house owners growth rate is negative starting in 
2005, it means that from 2005 through 2007 existing house owners bought more 
properties gobbling the new homes sold number as the vacancy rates are nil during 
that time. So most of the existing house owners postponed their sale decision but 
dynamically maxed out their equity immediately and the bailout base of 12,000 bn 
dollars stands. 
Table 12 A comparative analysis of mortgage growth in the US Source US Census, various 
other US Official Statistics Sources and own calculations
Year  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Home 7232 8269 9231 10456 11168  11166 
Multifamily residential  544 592 664 718 817  866 
Total 7776 8861 9895 11174 11985  12032 
Total less new homes sold 
at average US home price 
7401.25 8458.25 9466 10807.75 11723.5 11874 
Growth rate    13.95% 11.67% 12.93% 7.26%  0.39% 
New homes sold  1499000 1611000 1716000 1465000 1046000  632000 
Growth rate new homes    7.47% 6.52% -14.63% -28.60%  -39.58% 
House owners %  68.30% 69.00% 68.90% 68.80% 68.10%  67.80% 
House owners growth rate    1.02% -0.14% -0.15% -1.02%  -0.44% 
If we revert to the equation above, MBS2009*1.35*(1- MBS2008*1.3/MBS2009)
+ 1.35*Bailout = -6.2%*GDP 2008
And we have as -6.2%*GDP 2008= -862.71 bn (Source: US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis) 
Bailout = 4,895*0.61*1.35*(1-4,464*1.3/4,895*0.61)/1.35=1,452.3 bn Cicero I. LIMBEREA  134
So the maximum non-inflationary bailout package using this method is 
1,452.31 bn dollars, almost double the 787 billion proposed. This number could be 
slightly reduced by assuming some older mortgages and rental properties in the 
MBS base whose elasticity to real estate prices being low seems reasonable, but still 
the 787 billion number seems extremely low. 
In view of the low direct bailout amount, let’s build an ISLM model which 
will capture the monetary policy and the easing alternatives for this extreme 
contraction following the period of financial innovation when MBS tranches became 
widely accepted as enhancing M3. It is clear that structural changes in the demand 
for money had made banks accept MBS as quasi-liquid instruments, redefining 
money supply. Thus it is clear that the abrupt drop in property prices became a 
supply shock to the US economy.  
It was clear that in the years of the bubble, the Fed did not control M3. 
The ISLM model assumes equilibrium between the goods market and the 
money market, in an environment where inflation expectations ʌ
eare exogenous and 
y (GDP) and i (nominal interest rates) are determined out of the model, and i- ʌ
e is 
the real interest rate. ISLM (y0, i0, ʌ
e , i0= ʌ0
e,μ =  ʌ0
e). ʌ=p-p-1. μ the growth rate of 
money supply equals the inflation expectations (condition of the construction of the 
LM curve), μ-ʌ=m-p-(m-p)-1 If μ>ʌ money balances are growing. Thus on the 
demand side, given income and price levels, the demand for money is inversely 
related to nominal interest-sensitive money supply and the money multiplier cannot 
be controlled, k=k0+bi.
m-p=a2y-a3i is the equation of the LM curve with slope a2/a3 and intercept 
m-p/ a2
The points on the LM curve represent equilibrium in the asset markets. Thus 
we can assume that during the bubble years the mortgage expansion (i.e. expansion 
not due to expansionary monetary policy) shifted the LM curve to right so μ>ʌ for a 
period of time, reflecting a structural change in the demand for quasi-money from 
banks. This increased liquidity in mortgage pools is equivalent to as if the Fed had 
pumped more money into the economy. The increased real money balances reduced 
both the nominal and the real interest rates, from 10% mortgage rates in the late 
nineties to 6%, stimulating investment and increasing aggregate demand (See Shift 1 
in Figure 13). 
ʌ
ethe inflation expectations areindependent and constant, irrespective of ʌtthe 
realized inflation in the year t. Thus the Fed is presumed to be credible, coherent and 
inflation-neutral. Indeed the inflation expectations are contained and constant for the 
past 5 years, and so is the realized inflation around 2% (Source: Board of Governors 
of the US Federal Reserve System, 9/18/08) Thus the ISLM model can be applied in 
this context, supposing the Fed continues to apply its anti-inflation policy and be 
inflation-neutral. A QUANTIFICATION OF THE 2008-2009US BAILOUT PACKAGE 135 
The points on the IS curve represent the environment where aggregate 
demand equals aggregate supply only for a given rate of expected inflation.  
S(aving)=b0+b1y where b0 are inheritances, b1 is elasticity of savings and 
taxes with respect to income which equals the marginal propensity to save and tax 
over the average propensity to save and tax. Both are between 0 and 1 so their ratio 
can be higher than 1. 
I(nvestment)=b2+b3y-b4(i-  ʌ
e) where b2 the exogenous government 
expenditures, b3 is the interest elasticity of investment expenditures and b4 is the 
banks surplus. In the current environment, the banks are decapitalized due to i= ʌ
e
and except for the tax stimulus there is no incentive to invest for the same reason. 
S=I is the budgetary constraint, which renders y=-b4(i- ʌ
e)-b0+b2/(b1-b3) with 
slope (b3-b1)/b4 and fiscal policy contained in the IS curve with tax effect (b2-
b0)/(b1-b3) 
So IS(ʌ
e)=LM(μ) 
Figure 13 ISLM Equilibrium during the credit crunch
Initial equilibrium is at y0, formed by LM0 and IS0. During the bubble years, a 
permanent shift in the LM curve occurs, creating higher income and lower nominal 
interest rates. As the mortgages, due to losses, lose liquidity, a contraction reduces 
income drastically and raises non-investment grade interest rates, crowding out 
investment. The bailout package restores equilibrium levels to pre-bubble levels y3.
However, an increase in government expenditures associated with a decrease in 
lump-sum taxes shifts the IS curve to superior income y4 above both pre-bubble and 
bubble levels, at pre-bubble nominal interest rate levels. Cicero I. LIMBEREA  136
REFERENCES
1. M. Friedman – The Role of Monetary Policy, American Economic Review # 58, March 
1968 
2. Johnson, K.H. – Foreign Experience with Targets for Money Growth, Fed Reserve 
Bulletin # 69, Octomber 1983 
3. Marshall, A – Monetary Theory, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969 